We analyze the complexity of vote trading problems with equal-sized voting districts. For two allied voteswapping parties, the problem is polynomially solvable. For three parties, the problem is NP-complete.
Introduction
In the 2000 presidential elections in the USA, the essential decision was to be made between the Republican candidate George W. Bush (the incumbent governor of Texas and son of former president George Bush) and the Democratic candidate Al Gore (the incumbent Vice President). There also was a third candidate, the Green Party nominee Ralph Nader, but he was a clear outsider and in the end received less than 3% of the total votes. (We remind the reader that in US presidential elections the country is divided up into states each with a certain number of electoral votes. The number of electoral votes in a state is roughly proportional to a state's population. The candidate who wins most of a state's popular votes wins all of this state's electoral votes. The candidate who wins a majority of the electoral votes wins the election.)
Now the 2000 presidential elections were expected to be very close between Gore and Bush, as they both attracted similar numbers of voters in the polls leading up to the election. Since Gore and Nader had similar political positions, the supporters of Gore were concerned that Nader was potentially taking votes away from Gore in swing states and that Gore could thus lose the election because of the presence of Nader. Therefore vote trading was introduced, an Internet mechanism with the idea that Gore should become stronger in states where this would help him, while Nader should become stronger in states where this would not hurt Gore. The mechanism paired up Gore supporters in states that strongly favored Bush with Nader supporters in states where Gore and Bush were close. Each pair would agree to swap votes: the Gore supporter would vote for Nader and the Nader supporter would vote for Gore. In this way Gore would have a better chance to win in closely contested states, while Nader would still get the same number of votes nationally, which was important to him for future funding. As this mechanism preserves the total number of votes received by both candidates across states, it was attractive to electors and has also been implemented since in subsequent elections.
This vote trading mechanism raises a number of ethical issues that are discussed for instance by Randazza [8] , Hartvigsen [6] and Bervoets and Merlin [2] . Bervoets and Merlin [1] perform an axiomatic analysis of the problem of vote trading, as well as of the closely related problem of gerrymandering. On the algorithmic side, vote trading triggers the investigation of optimal strategies for the involved candidates. Hartvigsen [5] size. We show that then the best vote trading can be found in polynomial time, if there are only two allied parties that are swapping votes; note that this result is in contrast to the result with arbitrarily sized districts of Hartvigsen [5] . For three allied parties, however, also the problem with identical sized districts becomes NP-complete. Our results draw a sharp separation line between easy and hard cases. Furthermore, they yield yet another example for Lawler's mystical power of twoness; see Lenstra [7] .
The note is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses a variant of the classical subset sum problem, and identifies a polynomially solvable special case of this variant. Section 3 establishes a connection between vote swapping with two allied parties (and equalsized voting districts) and the subset sum variant from Section 2; this connection yields the polynomial time result. Section 4 establishes NP-hardness of vote swapping with three allied parties (and equal-sized voting districts).
A subset sum variant
Subset sum problems are centered around n items with positive integer sizes u 1 , . . . , u n , and ask certain questions about the values attained by u(I) :=  i∈I u i as I ranges over the item subsets I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. As a rule of thumb, subset sum problems are computationally intractable. For example, the problem of deciding whether u(I) attains all integer values between two given bounds V − and V + is Π p 2 -complete; see Eggermont and Woeginger [3] . As another example, the problem of deciding whether u(I) attains some concrete given integer goal value V is NP-complete; see Garey and Johnson [4] . This latter example with goal value V constitutes the classical SUBSET-SUM problem, which plays a fundamental and prominent role in the area of combinatorial optimization.
In general, we should not expect to find simple certificates for NO-instances of SUBSET-SUM that are easy to verify (as this would imply NP = coNP). But for certain well-behaved special cases the NO-instances are easy to recognize. For example, if all the item sizes u 1 , . . . , u n are even while the goal value V is odd, then the answer certainly must be NO. For another example, if the sum of the largest three values among u 1 , . . . , u n is strictly smaller than V while the sum of the smallest four values among u 1 , . . . , u n is strictly larger than V , then the answer also must be NO. In the rest of this section, we will consider the following subset sum variant and we will identify a polynomially solvable special case that is centered around this latter observation. 
is polynomially solvable.
Proof. First renumber the items so that • Determine the largest index r (0 ≤ r ≤ n) for which S max r < V − .
• If V + < S min r+1 then output NO, and otherwise output YES.
First assume that the algorithm outputs NO, so that S 
. We start with the set I = {1, . . . , r + 1} that contains the r + 1 smallest items, and then step by step replace some item by a larger one. Every step raises u(I) by at most max i u i −min i u i , so that by (1) the value u(I) eventually must fall between the bounds V − and V + . Hence also in this case, the output of the algorithm is correct.
The vote trading problem
In this section, we discuss the following special case of vote trading with three political parties A, B, C and with m equalsized voting districts. The number of voters in the ith district that respectively vote for A, B, C is denoted by a i , b i , c i . As all voting districts have equal size s, we have a i
Every district is won by the party that receives the relative majority of votes. For the sake of simplicity we assume that ties are always broken to the disadvantage of party A; therefore party A wins the ith district if and only if a i > max{b i , c i } holds.
The question is whether parties B and C can repartition their votes such that they reach the relative majority in at least k of the districts. This reflects the specific situation of the US presidential elections (involving Bush, Gore, and Nader) as discussed at the beginning of this paper: one might be pretty sure that even after vote trading between B and C (Gore and Nader) only one of B and C (Gore) will win any district. Under this assumption, keeping A below 50% will do the job. Here is a formal description of this question. 
Furthermore, we will assume without loss of generality that the numbering of the districts satisfies
Under (3) it is straightforward to see that parties B and C can win k districts if and only if they can win the first k districts. Finally, we will assume that
Note that whenever (4) 
Proof. For the only-if part, assume that the VOTE TRADING instance has answer YES. Consider the corresponding integers b 
which implies the right hand inequality in (5) . Similarly, a i ≤ c
By using (2) and (6) can be rewritten into the left hand inequality in (5).
For the if part, consider a set I ⊆ {1, . . . , k} that satisfies (5). For i ∈ I, we initialize b 
, the smallest item size is a 1 and the largest item size is a k . From (3) and (4) we derive the upper bounds a i ≤ s/2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and a i ≤ s for k + 1 ≤ i ≤ m. This yields
Since (7) is equivalent to the condition V
in (1), the polynomial time result now follows from Lemma 2.1.
A hardness result
Finally, let us discuss the generalization of the above VOTE TRADING problem to four political parties A, B, C , D in an odd number 2m − 1 of equal-sized voting districts. In the ith district (1 ≤ i ≤ 2m − 1) there are a i votes for party A, and parties B, C , D have respectively T B , T C , T D votes at there disposal that they may repartition. Since every district has exactly s voters, these numbers are assumed to satisfy Proof. From an instance of PARTITION, we construct 4n − 1 equalsized voting districts with s = (8n + 2)U voters. In the ith district, we define a i = 4nU + u i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n and a i = s for 2n
It is easily verified that these numbers satisfy (8) . We claim that the considered PARTITION instance has answer YES, if and only if the constructed instance of vote trading allows parties B, C , D to win the first 2n districts.
Assume that parties B, C , D can indeed win the first 2n districts.
As a i ≥ 4nU > T D for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n, party D is not able to win any of these districts. As for winning n + 1 districts against party A one needs more than (n + 1)4nU votes, parties B and C each must win precisely n districts. Since B, C , D will win the first 2n districts.
Final remarks
Our results precisely pinpoint the computational complexity of the considered vote trading problem: it is easy for p = 2 allied parties, and hard for p ≥ 3 allied parties. If the number p of allied parties is fixed (and not part of the input), the problem can be solved in pseudo-polynomial time by a routine dynamic programming approach. If the number p is part of the input, the problem is strongly NP-hard. This can be proved by a reduction from the strongly NP-hard THREE PARTITION problem [4] ; as the arguments are very similar to those in Section 4, we leave all details to the reader.
